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Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era
Emily Whelan ParentoI
ABSTRACT

Certificate of need (“CON”) programs were conceived approximately fifty years
ago as supply constraint mechanisms for healthcare services, in an environment that
is essentially unrecognizable today. Every aspect of the healthcare landscape has
changed dramatically, particularly in the years since the enactment of the
Affordable Care Act. The historical rationales in support of CON programs have
been vigorously questioned by scholars across disciplines, roundly criticized by the
federal government, and largely disproven by research. Yet the status quo persists
with thirty-five states retaining CON laws, due in large part to a combination of
entrenched interests and political inertia that prevents either repeal or significant
modification. Still, proponents of a more efficient healthcare model need not lose
hope. Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in its
implementation of the Affordable Care Act. As part of its implementation efforts,
the Commonwealth reformed its CON program to reward healthcare providers
who embrace rather than resist the changes occasioned by healthcare reform. While
the eventual impact of Kentucky’s CON modernization cannot yet be known, these
reforms may offer insights for additional states as they consider whether and how
to reform their own CON programs. Indeed, rather than being a historic relic that
I
Associate Professor of Law and Gordon D. Schaber Health Law Scholar, University of the Pacific
McGeorge School of Law; former Executive Director of the Office of Health Policy for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, a role whose responsibilities included oversight of the Kentucky
Certificate of Need Program. Many thanks to Cassie Chambers (Harvard Law, 2015) and Mena Arsalai
(McGeorge Law, 2016) for excellent research assistance. Particular thanks to former colleagues from the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services for the opportunity to collaborate on the
modernization of the Kentucky Certificate of Need Program—Audrey Tayse Haynes, Eric Friedlander,
Colleen Hagan, and Diona Mullins. I remain grateful for the opportunity to have served under the
visionary leadership of former Governor Steven L. Beshear during the implementation of the Affordable
Care Act.
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must be tolerated in the absence of political will for change, it may be possible for a
modernized CON program to serve as an additional regulatory tool for states
seeking to nudge their healthcare providers into fuller engagement in the postAffordable Care Act healthcare landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
CON programs are a powerful force in the majority of states, serving as a
gatekeeper of the supply of healthcare facilities. In thirty-five states and the District
of Columbia, providers of at least some healthcare services cannot simply enter a
market and begin providing the services upon meeting the standards established by
a state-licensing agency.1 Rather, under state CON laws, providers of healthcare
services must obtain a permit from the state before offering new services,
constructing new buildings, or purchasing new medical equipment. 2 For example, if
a hospital wishes to add additional beds to its facility, it must first convince state
officials that the addition is “needed,” a determination that states make under
varying theories and evaluation criteria.3 If the state is unpersuaded, the permit is
denied.4 While these programs have been remarkably persistent,5 the dramatic
changes in the U.S. healthcare environment following implementation of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6 present an opportunity for a
reconsideration of the role of CON in a modern regulatory system.
When CON programs were first conceived, they were largely envisioned as
cost-containment mechanisms, slowing healthcare cost increases by preventing
unfettered entry of new healthcare providers, particularly hospitals.7 Development
of these programs was heavily influenced by the theory of Milton Roemer that “a
built bed is a filled bed.”8 Thus, by preventing more beds from being built, and later
by preventing proliferation of other services deemed “unnecessary,” states—and, for
a time, the federal government—hoped to slow the alarming rise in healthcare
expenditures.9 Later, and perhaps in response to criticisms that the programs were
proving ineffective at achieving meaningful cost containment,10 additional

1
See Richard Cauchi & Ashley Noble, CON-Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-needstate-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/479B-MFEF].
2

Id.
See, e.g., 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need
Laws: A Prescription for Higher Costs, ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 50, 50.
4
Ohlhausen, supra note 3; see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040 (West 2016).
5
See Lisa Schencker, State Certificate-of-Need Laws Weather Persistent Attacks, MOD.
3

HEALTHCARE
(Jan.
23,
2016),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160123/MAGAZINE/301239964
[https://perma.cc/26VY-EDAE].
6
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 and 42 of the U.S.C.).
7
See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
8
Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 88 (2015); see also
Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue
Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 253 (1980).
9
Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
10
E.g., Bagley, supra note 8, at 89.
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justifications for the programs became prevalent, such as ensuring an adequate
distribution of healthcare services across geographic areas and socioeconomic
groups, providing states a regulatory lever to require that healthcare providers
deliver sufficient and quality care for the indigent.11 Supporters of CON also
correctly point to the fact that the market for healthcare services is not a normal
market, which may justify different and more stringent regulatory interventions
than in the case of an efficient market.12 For example, consumption of healthcare
services cannot be viewed as similar to consumption of a normal consumer
product—most healthcare services are ordered for patients (e.g., surgery, imaging),
and patients do not “shop” for these services like they do for other goods and
services.13 Proponents also argue that CON laws do not block change entirely;
rather, their primary value is to provide a formal role for evaluation by the state and
participation in the evaluation process by other interested stakeholders. 14
Those opposed to CON programs are vehement in their criticism, arguing that
by limiting new entrants to the market, CON programs reduce price competition
between facilities and may in fact promote a higher cost trajectory than would exist
without the laws.15 Moreover, opponents argue that the virtual elimination of the
“cost plus” pricing system in effect when CON laws were first enacted, in which
hospitals were reimbursed under a formula that paid them, in essence, the cost of
delivering a service plus a small percentage of profit, renders CON laws irrelevant
in the modern healthcare delivery system.16 Opponents also point to inconsistencies
in administration of CON programs by state officials, as well as the potential for
applications to be granted on the basis of political influence, institutional prestige,
or other factors apart from the “need” for a service or the interests of the
community.17 Moreover, opponents question whether state policymakers are best
situated to determine the best interests of a community and whether a particular
provider should be permitted to offer healthcare services in a given area.18

11
James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities
to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1030—31, 1031 n.25 (1986).
12
See, e.g., Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
13
Id. Although there is a considerable movement to create the tools to enable patients to shop and

to compare health services among providers based on cost and quality, thus far, these new technologies
have had only a small impact on consumer behavior. See, e.g., Price Transparency Initiatives for
Patients,
COUNTY
HEALTH
RANKINGS
&
ROADMAPS,
http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/policies/price-transparency-initiatives-patients
[https://perma.cc/C3EW-RHZT] (last updated Nov. 18, 2015).
14
Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
15

Id.

16

Matthew D. Mitchell, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws Limit Spending? 10 (Mercatus Ctr.,
Working Paper, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-mitchell-con-healthcarespending-v1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/U479-8W3B].
17
Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
18

Id.
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The evidence for the effectiveness of CON programs at achieving any of their
identified policy objectives is weak.19 Moreover, considerable evidence exists to
raise a serious question as to whether CON programs do more harm than good in
the healthcare markets in which they operate.20 For example, some studies show
that patients are at higher risk when undergoing certain procedures in CON states
than in non-CON states.21 Legal and policy scholars have been fairly unrestrained
in their criticism of CON programs, noting the potential for regulatory capture by
entrenched incumbent providers and the increasing irrelevance of CON laws in a
dramatically altered reimbursement environment for healthcare providers.22 And
although the federal government actively supported—and in effect, required—
states to enact CON laws for a brief period in the 1970s and 1980s, it has since
changed its views. Now, the federal government routinely questions whether states
should maintain CON laws, frequently offering comments from the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division as
states evaluate changes to or repeal their laws.23 Despite the strong and persistent
criticism leveled by scholars, researchers, and policymakers over the past decades,
CON programs have endured, remaining in effect in varying strength and breadth
in thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.24 And the repeal movement has
been stalled for at least the past fifteen years—no state has fully repealed its
program since Indiana in 1999.25
It is not for want of attempts to challenge that CON programs have endured. 26
Many frustrated healthcare providers, sometimes supported by organizations
favoring more free market competition, have challenged CON laws under various
constitutional theories, including the Commerce Clause, equal protection, and due
process.27 Those challenges have almost uniformly failed, except in the case of

19

See Bagley, supra note 8, at 89.

20

Press Release, Federal Trade Commission & Department of Justice, to Illinois Task Force on
Health Planning Reform, Agencies Say CON Laws Undercut Consumer Choice, Stifle Innovation and
Weaken Markets Ability to Contain Healthcare Costs (Sept. 12, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2008/09/federal-trade-commission-department-justice-issue-joint-statement
[https://perma.cc/W2RE-32YU].
21
See infra Subsection III.C.i. (describing research regarding impact of CON laws on quality of
care).
22
See infra Section II.B.
23
See infra Section III.A. (discussing the federal government’s criticism of CON programs).
24
See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
25
See Schencker, supra note 5. Note, however, that New Hampshire ended its Certificate of Need
board in 2016, but it is questionable whether the end of the CON board should be considered a full
repeal of CON in light of the ongoing CON-like oversight of new healthcare services by the New
Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. See Bob Sanders, State Pulls Plug on New
Hampshire Certificate of Need Board, N.H. BUS. REV. (June 15, 2016), http://www.nhbr.com/June24-2016/State-pulls-plug-on-NH-Certificate-of-Need-board/ [https://perma.cc/T9V4-YTHV].
26

Id.
See infra Part IV. (discussing, among others, Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 813
F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2016) and Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989)).
27
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documented and significant discriminatory effect of the laws toward out-of-state
healthcare providers,28 or where CON laws infringed on a fundamental right like a
woman’s ability to access abortion services.29
In view of the persistence of CON laws and the political inertia that prevents
their repeal, legislators and policymakers must think creatively about strategies to
evolve these programs to meet the challenges presented by the new healthcare
environment. In particular, the Affordable Care Act has dramatically altered the
delivery and payment landscapes for all healthcare providers, and these are changes
that seem virtually certain to remain regardless of the different directions healthcare
reform may proceed after the administration of President Barack Obama. 30
Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in the country
for its implementation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) under former
Governor Steven L. Beshear.31 Indeed, with over 570,000 additional individuals
obtaining Medicaid and a drop in the Commonwealth’s uninsured rate from 16%
prior to the ACA to 8% at the end of 2014,32 some of the reasons for CON, such
as ensuring that existing providers retain sufficient ability to deliver care to the
uninsured, must be reexamined.33 This paper uses the experience of Kentucky in
modernizing its CON program following implementation of the ACA as a case
study, drawing lessons that may have further application as other states consider
reforms to their programs. 34 In particular, as part of its reform process, Kentucky
appears to be the first state to have adopted explicit preferences in its CON
program for providers who meet objective quality thresholds under federal
government quality rankings, as well as preferences for providers who participate in
so-called “value-based payment” programs, which seek to reward healthcare
providers who deliver high-value care to patients.35 In addition, Kentucky’s
reformed CON program requires new providers to adopt electronic medical records
and participate in its health information exchange, with the goal of improving the
ability of healthcare providers to coordinate patient care.36 These elements of the
revision process may be appropriate for duplication or adaptation in other state
28
29

See infra Part IV. (discussing legal challenges to CON laws).

Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016), CON laws impacting the right to abortion and other reproductive freedoms may be
ripe for new challenge.
30
See Bagley, supra note 8, at 62–68.
31
Samantha Artiga, et al., Implementation of the ACA in Kentucky: Lessons Learned to Date and
the Potential Effects of Future Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (April 2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-implementation-of-the-aca-in-kentucky-lessons-learned-todate-and-the-potential-effects-of-future-changes [https://perma.cc/3W97-R5N2] (“Kentucky has had
one of the most successful ACA implementation experiences among states.”).
32
Id. at 1–2.
33
E.g., Simpson, supra note 11, at 1031–32.
34
See infra Part V.
35
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E, §§ I.C., III.A., III.B., V.B. (2016).
36
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016).
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programs, as states consider which of their regulatory levers they can use to help
shape a more effective, efficient healthcare delivery system.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the evolution of CON programs,
from the early experiments in health system planning following World War II
through the CON programs in place today. Part III describes the longstanding
federal government skepticism toward CON programs and the views of law and
policy scholars as to the effectiveness of CON laws, and then considers the
evidence of the impact of CON laws on cost, quality and access, as well as evidence
regarding the political influence that permeates the programs. Part IV evaluates the
nearly uniform failure of legal challenges to CON laws. Part V offers the
experience of Kentucky in modernizing its CON program as a case study in the
evolution of CON programs to meet the demands of a post-Affordable Care Act
healthcare ecosystem. Part VI concludes this discussion.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAMS

A. Early Iterations of Certificate of Need
CON programs are a powerful force in the majority of states, serving as a
gatekeeper to the supply of healthcare facilities.37 Under CON laws, healthcare
facilities are required to obtain a permit from state health planning entities before
offering new services, constructing new buildings, or purchasing new medical
equipment.38 For example, if a hospital wishes to add additional beds to its facility,
it must seek approval from the state, which will evaluate the request based on a
determination of, at minimum, whether there exists sufficient public “need” for the
new beds.39 If the state determines that the need for the requested facility is not
proven, the permit is denied.40 Beyond need, which is usually determined either in
whole or in part by reference to a numeric formula, 41 additional review criteria may
exist, including accessibility, costs, feasibility, available economic resources, quality,
and others.42
Others have written comprehensively about the history of the development of
CON programs in the United States, and this Article will not duplicate that
work.43 However, an understanding of the underlying rationale for CON and
changes in the programs over time is essential to understanding their place in the
modern healthcare delivery system. In most instances, the government allows
market forces to determine the appropriate supply of a product, and consumers to
37

See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
Id.
39
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
38

40

See supra note 3–4 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016).
42
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(2)(a)(2) (West 2016).
43
See generally Simpson, supra note 11; Payton & Powsner, supra note 8.
41
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purchase the amount of that product that meets their needs.44 However, the market
for healthcare services is not a normal market, and it is this recognition that led to
the development of health planning authorities and ultimately to CON programs. 45
Following the end of World War II, “faced with the aging infrastructure of a
healthcare system ill-equipped to accommodate the needs of returning soldiers and
the inevitable baby boom that followed,”46 Congress passed the Hospital Survey
and Construction Act (the “Hill-Burton Act,” or the “Act”), which was designed to
promote public and nonprofit hospital construction and modernization, primarily
through the availability of federal funding for certain healthcare facility
construction and modernization projects.47 As described in its statement of
purpose, the Hill-Burton Act included a health planning function, as the Act was
intended to assist states:
[I]nventory their existing hospitals . . . to survey the need for
construction of hospitals, and to develop programs for
construction of such public and other nonprofit hospitals as will,
in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the necessary
physical facilities for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and
similar services to all their people . . . .48
As Nicholas Bagley recently observed, although the scope of the Hill-Burton
Act increased rapidly throughout the 1960s, the health planning in this era “lacked
regulatory bite,” as planning agencies could advocate for particular facilities and
services to be provided, but could not compel the private sector to build facilities or
provide the needed services.49 At approximately the same time, increasing health
sector costs led government officials to look to additional strategies to regulate
costs, including by instituting CON programs to constrain facility supply as a cost
control mechanism, an approach heavily influenced by theory of Milton Roemer
that “[a] built bed is a filled bed.” 50 Under Roemer’s Law, there exists a direct
correlation between capacity and utilization; when combined with the availability of
third-party reimbursement, oversupply of resources will create its own demand for
44
45

See Bagley, supra note 8, at 71–74.
Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.

46

Carol Brayshaw Longwell & James T. Steele, Jr., The Rise and Fall of Certificate of Need in
Pennsylvania: An Experiment in Healthcare Planning and the Role of the Commonwealth Court, 21
WIDENER L.J. 185, 186 (2011).
47
Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, tit. VI, 60 Stat. 1040, 1041–49
(1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2016)); see also The Hill-Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in
the Delivery of Healthcare to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316, 316 (1979).
48
See Hospital Survey and Construction Act § 601(a); see also Bagley, supra note 8, at 85–90
(2015) (discussing the evolution of state health facility supply planning).
49
Bagley, supra note 8, at 87–88.
50
Milton I. Roemer, M.D., Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, J. AM.
HOSP. ASS’N, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36, 36; see also Bagley, supra note 8, at 88.
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excessive use.51 Thus, to prevent both overutilization of services and to control
costs, supply constraints effected through CON programs were not only justifiable
but actively supported by federal and state policymakers. 52
In 1966, New York became the first state to establish a CON program,
requiring state approval for construction of hospital and nursing home
construction, and was quickly followed by twenty states over the next six years. 53
The federal government soon followed suit and in recognition of the contribution
of the “massive infusion of Federal funds into the existing healthcare system” to
“inflationary increases in the cost of healthcare” and the “fail[ure] to produce an
adequate supply or distribution of health resources,” Congress passed the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (“NHPRDA”).54
NHPRDA provided significant funding for state health planning activities and
“effectively required states to adopt certificate of need laws conforming to federal
standards.”55 By 1980, every state except Louisiana had a CON program. 56
Beyond their core supply constraint function, state CON programs often
contain additional regulatory goals, including promotion and preservation of high
quality healthcare services—which, as others have observed, is closely related to
cost containment given the documented correlation between sufficient volume of
services and quality of care.57 Some CON programs also contain general goals or
specific review criteria regarding adequate distribution of services among
geographic areas as well as social and economic groups—for example, some CON
programs require applicants to demonstrate a plan for the provision of charity
care.58 Additional policy goals may include reducing state expenditures on public
programs, such as by limiting the number of nursing home beds (nursing home
care is primarily funded through the Medicaid program), and ensuring the state

51
John Steen, The Dartmouth Atlas on Roemer’s Law, DARTMOUTH ATLAS (2008)
http://www.ahpanet.org/files/TheDartmouthAtlasonRoemer'sLaw%20b.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R8NCE6J].
52
An alternative theory of the evolution of CON programs was posited by Sallyanne Payton and
Rhoda M. Powsner, who wrote that Blue Cross and leading public and private health officials promoted
CON in the late 1950s with goals to “(1) to restore public confidence [that had eroded with rising costs]
in the voluntary hospitals and their financing arm, the Blue Cross . . . ; (2) to protect the dominance of
the existing large voluntary teaching hospitals; and (3) to channel hospital growth in the developing
suburbs into large, full-service, general hospitals.” Payton & Powsner, supra note 8, at 204.
53
Simpson, supra note 11, at 1036.
54
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–641, 88
Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 300k).
55
See Simpson, supra note 11, at 1026; see also National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974.
56
See Matthew Mitchell & Christopher Koopman, 40 Years of Certificate-of-Need Laws Across
America, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/40-yearscertificate-need-laws-across-america [https://perma.cc/6AS-DGMD].
57
See Simpson, supra note 11, at 1029–30.
58
See id. at 1030–32, 1031 n.25.
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maintains a role in large health policy decisions impacting state residents, such as
the location of a new hospital.59
While laudable in intent, CON programs were largely perceived as falling short
of expectations by the early 1980s, particularly as a deregulatory political climate
prevailed.60 Costs continued to escalate, and a number of studies found that CON
programs did not help contain healthcare expenditures.61 Moreover, as larger and
more influential healthcare entities learned to navigate the often complicated and
bureaucratic programs, perceptions of protectionism of incumbents further
undermined support for CON.62 Congress, too, became skeptical of the benefits of
CON and repealed NHPRDA in 1987.63 By 1990, eleven states repealed their
programs, and by 2000 a total of fourteen states had repealed their CON laws. 64

B. The Stagnant Status Quo
Although many states repealed their programs following the repeal of the
federal mandate, the trend toward full repeal has stalled. The last two states to
repeal their programs were Indiana (1999) and Wisconsin (2000), although
Wisconsin reinstated its program in 2011.65 And in some sectors of healthcare,
regulation via CON remains quite strong. For example, a 2004 study examined
state policies for CON or moratoria for new building, renovation, and remodeling
of long-term care providers, surveying state officials over a twelve year period from
1990–2002.66 By 2002, the study found that the vast majority of states still
regulated the supply of nursing homes, hospital-based nursing homes, and facilities
for the developmentally disabled.67 In addition, the study found that “18 percent of
states regulate the supply of residential care facilities, 35 percent regulate home

59
60

See id.
See id. at 1026–27 (describing deregulatory goals of the administration of President Ronald

Reagan).
61
See, e.g., Christopher J. Conover & Frank A. Sloan, Does Removing Certificate-of-Need
Regulations Lead to a Surge in Healthcare Spending?, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 455, 456

(1998).
62
See Bagley, supra note 8, at 86 (citing Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation
Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203,

233 (1980)).
63
See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88
Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k-300n-6 (1982)), amended by Health Planning and
Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), repealed by Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
64
Mitchell & Koopman, supra note 56.
65
Id. However, see supra note 26 for a description of New Hamphire’s 2016 termination of its
CON board.
66
Charlene Harrington, et al., Trends in State Certificate of Need and Moratoria Programs for
Long-Term Care Providers 19 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 31, 31 (2004).
67

Id.
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health agencies, and 37 percent regulate hospices.”68 In line with the traditional
bases for CON programs, the authors found that the CON programs were based
primarily based on strategies seeking cost containment and the appropriate
distribution of services.69 The authors cautioned, however, that CON programs
that placed limits on home and community service providers could negatively
impact access to care.70
While CON remains prevalent, there continues to be vigorous debate over the
wisdom of these programs in states at all points along the political spectrum. In
recent years, several states have reexamined the efficacy of the CON system and
proposed modifications to existing CON programs. In 2009, half of the thirty-six
states with CON programs had bills to repeal or reform these programs introduced
in their state legislatures. 71 Illinois attempted significant reform that year, but those
efforts resulted in fairly modest change.72 Fascinatingly, and relevant to the
discussion of political influence in CON, manipulation of the CON process was
one of the alleged corrupt activities that led to the removal of former Governor Rod
Blagojevich from office and his ultimate indictment on charges of fraud, extortion
and racketeering.73 In a dramatic twist, Pamela Davis, a hospital CEO whose
project had been stalled under the review process, wore a wire to assist the FBI in
its investigation.74
Around the same time in Alaska and Hawaii, Governors Sarah Palin and Linda
Lingle attempted to repeal their states’ CON laws, but neither succeeded. 75 And in
2008, Florida Governor Charlie Crist began an attempt to terminate the program
but ultimately compromised on a reform bill in lieu of repeal. 76 Beyond full repeal,
the National Conference of State Legislatures reported that CON-related bills
were also introduced in 2009 in seventeen additional states.77 In Alabama, a bill to
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repeal CON was unsuccessful in the face of robust opposition from the state’s
hospital association.78 In Oregon, the Association of Hospitals and Health Systems
broke with most hospital associations and took the relative outlier position that
“certificate of need is a failed experiment in regulating construction.”79 Nonetheless,
the association opposed two bills introduced to slightly modify the CON process,
preferring its own legislation, which it characterized as an approach that relied
more on transparency through disclosure rather than regulation.80 While no repeal
efforts have succeeded since 1999, several states have undertaken smaller reform
efforts, focusing on piecemeal changes to CON programs, such as exempting
certain types of medical services from CON requirements. 81 In 2009, several states
passed small reforms to their CON systems, including New Jersey, Maryland,
Washington, and West Virginia.82 Other states, including Connecticut, Illinois,
and Georgia, have also reformed their CON programs in recent years.83
These efforts at CON reform have continued in the post-Affordable Care Act
era. For example, the North Carolina state legislature recently considered a bill that
would have exempted certain ambulatory surgical centers from obtaining a CON. 84
Although the session expired without a vote on the CON legislation, several
members of the legislature expressed support for continued reform efforts.85 And in
2013, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley vetoed the $2 million allocated in the
state budget for the CON program.86 Although the state legislature sustained
Haley’s veto, several hospitals sued the state. 87 These hospitals argued that Haley
was improperly using her veto to eliminate the CON program, and that her actions
had exceeded her executive authority.88 The legal battle eventually reached the
state’s Supreme Court, which ruled that the state had to continue to administer the
CON program.89
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As of 2016, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have CON programs
of varying depth and scope.90 Of the states that retain CON programs, the most
heavily regulated services are long-term care and nursing home beds (35 plus
D.C.), acute hospital beds (27), ambulatory surgical centers (26), cardiac
catherization (25), long-term acute care (25 plus D.C.), psychiatric services (25),
open heart surgery (24), rehabilitation (24), and neo-natal intensive care (22).91
II. SKEPTICISM TOWARD CERTIFICATE OF NEED FROM ALL QUARTERS

A. Longstanding Federal Government Skepticism Toward Certificate of Need
Although the decision whether to maintain a CON program has been the
prerogative of the states since the repeal of NHPRDA in 1987, the federal
government has not been neutral on the issue. Rather, for at least the past fifteen
years, the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division have taken an active position
against the continuance of CON programs.
For example, the FTC and DOJ issued statements to the Illinois Task Force on
Health Planning Reform;92 the General Assembly and the Senate of the state of
Georgia;93 the Committee on Health, Education and Social Services of the Alaska
House of Representatives;94 and the Florida Senate Committee on Health and
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Human Services Appropriations,95 in each instance reiterating the government’s
position that CON laws undercut consumer choice, stifle innovation and weaken
the market forces that could otherwise operate to help promote competition and
potentially reduce the growth rate of healthcare expenditures. In the joint
statements, the agencies opine that CON laws impede the efficient performance of
healthcare markets by creating barriers to entry and expansion, to the detriment of
healthcare competition and consumers.96 The agencies cite economic research on
the effects of CON laws, as well as some of the well-known risks that CON laws
entail. For example, the agencies observe that in addition to limiting entry, CON
laws create opportunities for existing competitors to exploit the CON process to
thwart or delay new competition; they can facilitate anticompetitive agreements
among providers; and, as noted by a number of researchers who interviewed former
state CON officials, the CON process itself may be susceptible to corruption.97
In the joint statements, the agencies also evaluate several arguments in support
of CON laws, noting that the original cost-control reasons for CON laws no
longer apply and that CON laws are an ineffective means by which to fund
indigent care.98 For these reasons, the agencies encourage states that continue to
require certificates of need to consider whether such laws do more harm than
good.99 In addition to participating in individual state deliberations about the future
of CON programs, in 2004 the agencies took the additional step of issuing a joint
report entitled “Improving Healthcare: A Dose of Competition,” in which they
were unrestrained in their criticism of CON laws:
The Agencies believe that, on balance, CON programs are not
successful in containing healthcare costs, and that they pose
serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their
purported economic benefits. Market incumbents can too easily
use CON procedures to forestall competitors from entering the
incumbent’s market. . . . Indeed, there is considerable evidence
that CON programs can actually increase prices by fostering
anticompetitive barriers to entry.100
95
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In 2015 the agencies issued a joint statement in Virginia, in which they address
several concerns about CON programs.101 First, the agencies observe that CON
laws create barriers to entry, thereby suppressing competition, reducing the ability
of markets to respond to demand for innovative and higher-quality and lower cost
treatments, and shielding incumbent providers from competition from new
entrants.102 Moreover, as the agencies observe, CON laws may further harm
competition because competing healthcare providers may take advantage of the
CON process to protect their businesses by using the CON process (e.g., filing
comments, objecting to a competitor’s application) to slow or thwart a competitor’s
attempt to enter the market.103 Third, and perhaps most significantly from the
agencies’ perspective, CON laws can “entrench anticompetitive mergers by limiting
the ability to implement effective structural remedies.”104 Drawing on the recent
experience of the FTC in FTC v. Phoebe Putney which involved a challenge to the
merger of two hospitals in Albany, Georgia,105 the agencies note that the FTC was
precluded by Georgia’s CON laws from obtaining a remedy that would have
restored competition to the marketplace following a merger that created a
monopoly on certain services in Albany.106 The FTC noted that the case “illustrates
how state CON laws, despite their original and laudable goal of reducing
healthcare facility costs, often act as a barrier to entry to the detriment of
competition and healthcare consumers.”107 Thus, the agencies conclude that the
Virginia working group studying the state’s CON laws should carefully consider
whether and under what circumstances the laws should be retained. 108
The agencies have also acted independently from one another in voicing
concern over CON laws. For example, in 2008, the DOJ sent a letter to the
Michigan Certificate of Need Commission warning against proposed standards for
proton beam therapy because of the harm the CON program could have on
competition and on consumers.109 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has
101
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published staff statements before several states reiterating its position in favor of
full repeal of CON laws.110 And, as described in Section III.B., current FTC
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen penned a 2015 article in which she vigorously
questioned the ability of CON programs to deliver on any of their enumerated
policy objectives.111

B. Criticism of Certificate of Need From Scholars Across Disciplines
Among academic scholars, it is rare to find ardent, or even lukewarm defenders
of CON programs. Although the arguments for the effectiveness of CON have not

110
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been conclusively disproven,112 the prevailing view reflects considerable skepticism
about the ability of CON programs to achieve any of their intended aims. And
even when the programs were at their most popular, many were questioning
whether CON programs could truly deliver the benefits they promised.
In 1973, a time when CON programs were very much in vogue, Clark
Havinghurst noted that it was “appropriate to inquire whether there is a realistic
basis for expecting desirable results from introducing such regulatory controls in the
market for health services.”113 While acknowledging the facially persuasive nature
of the arguments in favor of CON programs,114 he nonetheless noted that at their
core, CON programs are attempts to address symptoms rather than root causes of
the underlying problems of escalating cost and utilization. 115 Havinghurst correctly
observed that the rationale for CON programs depended on the “continued
predominance of financing mechanisms which encourage inefficiency both by
guaranteeing recovery of costs, no matter how great, and by externalizing the costs
of doctors’ and patients’ consumption decisions.”116 When compared to the
potential for truly disruptive change in the healthcare delivery system, CON
programs could be viewed as “conservative measures, designed to preserve the very
institutions which create the problems to which they are addressed.” 117 While he
acknowledged similarities of the certificate of need process and its underlying
theories supporting regulation to the “public utility” model of healthcare regulation
espoused by some, Havinghurst suggested that CON programs were unlikely to be
“appreciably effective” controlling costs due to the “practically unavoidable slippage
involved in translating a persuasive rationale for regulation into a workable
regulatory program.”118 Moreover, he noted that negative impacts associated with
the interference with normal market forces, such as delays in innovation or
reductions in efficiency, might outweigh the limited benefits CON programs could
provide.119
Many others were equally skeptical of the benefits of CON programs, at least as
they were administered in practice. By 1986, a number of states had repealed their
CON programs, in part in response to the institution of the Medicare prospective
112
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payment system (providers were essentially paid a set fee for their services rather
than a cost-based rate) and the increase in enrollment in health maintenance
organizations, whose business model contained independent incentives for cost
containment.120 Simpson noted that in making the decision to repeal their CON
programs, states expressed “exasperation with the controversy that often surrounds
certificate of need decisions.”121 Indeed, it appeared that Havinghurst’s caution
about the distinction between CON programs as envisioned and as actually
administered was leading to skepticism as to the value the programs added to the
healthcare delivery system. The debate continued in subsequent decades, with no
resolution.
In 1993, one of the few defenders of CON, Robert Hackey of the University of
Massachusetts, acknowledged the rampant criticism of CON programs over the
prior decade, but argued that more recent evidence suggested that CON programs
“may be more effective than commonly believed.”122 While acknowledging that
CON programs had not been shown to lower healthcare costs, Hackey argued that
the expectations for meaningful cost control had always been unrealistic in relation
to what the programs could actually deliver, placing a portion of the blame on the
federal government’s overly heavy reliance on indirect cost containment strategies
like CON (as a tool to reduce capital expenditures by hospitals) rather than more
direct strategies like rate setting by regulation.123 Moreover, Hackey was an early
proponent of broadening the goals of CON programs beyond cost containment to
include additional policy objectives, such as increasing access to care for the
indigent and increasing lay participation in health policy planning.124 Thus, rather
than viewing CON as a failed experiment in cost containment, Hackey
optimistically concluded that CON programs could assume a broader role in the
1990s as additional policy objectives were incorporated into the programs. 125 By
1998, writing with Peter Fuller, Hackey was more tempered in his views,
acknowledging that in neighboring state Rhode Island, the ability of the CON
program to achieve its goals had been hampered by a number of factors, including
significant resource disparities between the state agency and the private entities that
sought approval for new projects.126 Nonetheless, he maintained that Rhode
Island’s CON program, if appropriately funded and supported by leadership in the
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legislative and executive branches, could still offer the state a valuable mechanism
by which to shape the organization and delivery of healthcare services.127
There do not appear to be many other researchers who shared Hackey’s
optimistic views. Rather, the prevailing view seems to have been steadily mounting
criticism of CON laws. For example, in 1995, as Connecticut was considering
abolishing its CON program, Quinnipiac Law Professor W. John Thomas urged
the General Assembly to terminate the program on the grounds that during the
two decades in which Connecticut had CON in place, there had been “a wealth of
empirical studies indicating that such laws do not produce economic savings,”
studies which also “produced little evidence to suggest that CON laws have a
positive effect on either the quality of or access to healthcare.”128
In addition, by the mid 1990s, as managed healthcare companies became
increasingly prevalent in the insurance market, there were increasing questions as to
the relevance of CON under this new payment system. After all, if the purpose of
managed care was in fact to manage both care and cost by negotiating lower rates
with providers and ensuring appropriate utilization, what additional value would
CON bring? In a 1995 note, Patrick McGinley argued for the repeal of Florida’s
CON law on the grounds that its recently instituted managed competition system
rendered the CON program moot, and indeed, that the continuance of the CON
program risked the failure of Florida’s managed competition strategy. 129 McGinley
argued that if hospitals were protected from competition by CON laws, managed
healthcare companies would be severely hamstrung in their ability to negotiate
more favorable rates.130
In 2001, as Illinois policymakers were engaged in debate about a controversial
hospital expansion project, state government attorney Lauretta Higgins Wolfson
explicitly questioned whether the Illinois CON process had become so tainted by
politics that it ought to be abolished.131 Wolfson observed that “[h]ospitals and
market players have accused [the issuing entity] of being politically influenced . . .
and . . . influenced by lobbyists rather than healthcare needs.”132 Indeed, some
contemporaneous critics in the national debate alleged that “the process of
obtaining a CON has become an enterprise in itself ‘...becoming so lucrative that it
attracts many politicians and former politicians who successfully use their influence
to weight the process for those who employ their services.’”133 Wolfson concluded
127
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that in Illinois, “[a]n analysis of CON theory and practices clearly shows that
important public health decisions are being made by an entrenched group of men
and women, virtually unknown and accountable to no one,” and called for change
in the form of research studies to evaluate the premises underlying CON
programs.134 Moreover, Wolfson argued that in the event the program remained, it
would require considerable administrative simplification along with a removal of
political influence and the resulting appearance of impropriety. 135
A 2007 study assessing the perception of Maryland’s CON program through a
small-scale survey of hospital administrators found mixed results.136 While
acknowledging that the survey participants tended to report agreement with the
position of their facilities as a CON facility, the authors found that respondents
tended to agree there was a relationship between patient volumes and the quality of
care.137 More interestingly, the survey respondents agreed that CON decisions were
influenced by politics, and that the public plays an insignificant role in decision
making.138 Even with those shortcomings in the program, respondents were
concerned that terminating the CON program would lead to at least a short-term
flooding of the market with unneeded services.139
Although only Wisconsin has reinstated its program after repeal, 140 states that
repealed their CON laws have periodically reconsidered the reasons for repeal. For
example, a 2006 analysis of the history of California’s CON program and the
reasons for its repeal concluded that the program suffered from inadequate staffing
and lack of data, which resulted in the program being significantly less effective
than if it had been adequately resourced.141 Although the program, initiated in
1969, had attempted to ensure access to quality healthcare and to contain costs by
restricting excess hospital capacity, the report concluded that CON was ultimately
viewed as a failure, an outcome that was heavily influenced not only by the lack of
resources but also because of a number of exceptions that made the program
difficult to administer, as well as relative lack of enforcement for noncompliance.142
Even today, more than forty years after Congress first adopted national
legislation on certificate of need, the debate remains unsettled, though there
appears to widespread acknowledgement that CON programs as administered are
essentially unable to be insulated from political influence. Arguing in 2010 in favor
134
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of a more evolved model of state health planning rather than turning the healthcare
delivery system over to market forces, John Blum acknowledged the marked
distinction between the intent and reality of CON programs:
Somewhere along the journey of C.O.N. laws, these statutes
became dominated by process review and evaluation, and the core
function of creating state and regional health plans dropped from
the agenda of these agencies, or planning was turned over to state
bureaucrats whose best efforts were foiled by political realities. 143
Indeed, a 2010 retrospective article examining the forty-year history of Rhode
Island’s CON program, written by a former program director, observed that Rhode
Island’s recent passage of laws bringing physician-operated ambulatory surgery
centers and freestanding magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) and computed
topography (“CT”) scanning machines under the umbrella of CON was driven
primarily by hospitals seeking to erect barriers to external competition for provision
of those services rather than a need to restrict competition among providers of
those services.144 In Pennsylvania, a 2011 analysis revealed that even the sunset of
the state’s CON laws did not mean the end of the component parts of the program,
which were quickly reconstituted in different state agencies in response to a desire
among state policymakers to continue the program.145 Following the sunset of the
state’s CON laws, the state Department of Health announced its intention to
strictly construe the quality provisions in its licensing statutes (in addition to
obtaining a certificate of need to provide the new services, applicants must also
meet certain quality and other standards to be licensed to provide the services), and
another state agency developed a new policy under which it would contract only
with entities that met standards that were essentially the same as those that existed
under the abolished CON program.146
Most recently in 2015, current FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen
characterized certificate of need programs as a “prescription for higher costs.”147
Ohlhausen observed that CON programs were particularly unhelpful to achieving
the goals of healthcare market regulation in that they “stand out as an example of
regulation that squelches the beneficial effects of competition in healthcare markets
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without delivering valuable public benefits in return.”148 Noting that the cost-plus
payment methodology that was in existence at the time programs began 149 has been
largely abolished in favor of negotiated rates between insurers and providers,
Ohlhausen argued that as the “purported market failure that CON laws were
designed to fix no longer exists,” it should surprise no one that “it has proven
difficult to demonstrate the benefits of a legislative scheme designed to fix an issue
overtaken by subsequent events.”150 She further explained that although the benefits
of CON have been difficult to quantify, the negative results are readily apparent—
CON laws operate to insulate healthcare providers from “socially beneficial”
competition.151 She correctly raises the question as to why CON laws are still on
the books in thirty-five states even in the absence of demonstrable success at
achieving their original cost containment objectives. 152 The answer, it seems, is a
combination of legislative inertia and shifting policy rationales of CON proponents
to justify the continued existence of the programs. Ohlhausen observes that CON
laws “insulate politically powerful incumbents from market forces, and those
providers naturally are loathe to give up the special government preferences that
CON laws bestow.” 153 However, she writes, incumbents cannot directly espouse to
legislators that they deserve special protection at the expense of the public
interest—so instead, providers have adopted new rationales for the continued
existence of CON, among them that the programs allow for improved care of the
indigent.154 This argument must be deconstructed to be understood, because it is
not readily apparent how insulation from competition leads to better care for the
poor. In essence, incumbents argue that the guarantee of restricted competition
allows them to negotiate higher prices with private insurance companies, thereby
conferring a larger profit margin, which allows for more resources to provide care to
poorer patients without insurance.155 So, there is a cross-subsidization whereby
providers, usually hospitals, will charge higher rates to wealthier patients and retain
profitable procedures that might otherwise migrate to lower-cost venues (e.g.,
imaging, outpatient surgical procedures) to subsidize unprofitable areas of the
business, including indigent care.156 The trouble, as Ohlhausen notes, is that this
argument has not been proven to be correct—studies have not shown a marked
148
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difference in the provision of indigent care by hospitals in CON states as compared
to those in states without the programs.157
Ohlhausen is careful to distinguish among the circumstances in which CON
laws offer the most benefit to incumbent healthcare providers. For example, in
areas with stable or declining populations, CON laws would not normally provide
much benefit to incumbent providers, as the incentive for new entrants to the
market is low. 158 Conversely, in areas of rapid growth in population or demand for
healthcare, CON laws restricting entry confer a valuable benefit on incumbents and
are likely to increase prices, potentially giving providers a material windfall.159
Moreover, Ohlhausen notes the unintended impact of CON laws on market
efficiency: in a normal market, new entrants would be incentivized to provide
services when incumbents either charged excessively high prices or operated at low
levels of efficiency.160 However, the protection of CON laws effectively benefits the
weakest providers, who are insulated from the pressures of competition, while
higher quality providers likely benefit less from CON due to the lower level of
incentive for new provider entry.161 The degree of benefit is also influenced by a
number of intertwined variables such as the scope of the CON law (e.g., the
number of services regulated and the threshold for triggering a CON requirement),
the degree of enforcement, and the probability of new entry or expansion in the
absence of a CON law.162 Importantly, Ohlhausen points out, the degree of benefit
to incumbents operates independently of the expected outcome—that is, how well
healthcare providers execute their charge to provide indigent care. 163 Not only do
providers reap uneven benefits from CON laws, the degree of benefit appears
unrelated to both the level of expected indigent care and the quality of that care. 164
Thus, she surmises that the “poor fit” between CON laws and the goal of providing
indigent care demonstrates that arguments by CON proponents that the programs
support indigent care claims “appear to be little more than an argument of
convenience by politically powerful special interests attempting to protect their
historical government perquisites.”165
A better approach to indigent care, in Ohlhausen’s view, would be for states to
fund indigent care costs directly rather than through the hidden costs CON inflicts
on the insured public and the market as a whole. 166 While urging that all states
repeal their CON laws, she cautions that repeal alone is unlikely to create
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immediate, dramatic results due to what she believes is the “modest drag on the
economy” that the laws exert.167 Ultimately, Ohlhausen concludes that government
regulations such as CON, which undermine the “socially beneficial competitive
process without returning any offsetting benefits simply cannot be justified.”168

C. Research Casts Serious Doubt on the Effectiveness of
Certificate of Need Programs
When assessing the evidence with regard to the effectiveness of CON
programs, it is necessary to examine the research in light of the primary objectives
of CON laws. The cost containment rationale is the oldest justification for CON
laws, but it has been supplemented by additional policy objectives, such as
increasing access to care, particularly for low-income populations, and improving
quality among healthcare providers. In general, the evidence base for the ability of
CON programs to achieve any of these objectives is weak, although studies vary in
design and rigor.
i. CON Programs Do Not Appear to Lead to a
Reduced Healthcare Cost Trajectory
At first glance, it is not apparent how a supply constraint mechanism can result
in lower costs for a product. Conventional economic theory suggests that restricting
supply of a product does not result in reduced prices—rather, assuming constant
demand, prices would increase in the face of decreased supply as more people
competed to purchase a product in limited supply. However, healthcare is not a
normal product and the market for health services has a number of factors that
render it far from efficient. Thus, the theory for the ability of CON programs to
contain costs, as noted above, is that by restricting the arms race among healthcare
providers to build ever newer and more expensive facilities (e.g., new hospital
buildings when an older one will suffice) and to offer newer and more expensive
services even when those services are not demonstrably more effective than older
treatments (e.g., MRI and CT scans instead of X-rays), CON programs prevent
providers from raising prices to reflect the costs of these newer facilities and
treatments.169 This theory was reasonable at the time it was first conceived—when
providers were often paid an amount equal to their cost plus a small percentage of
that cost, there was no incentive for providers to keep costs low.170 Thus, it stood to
reason that restricting the ability of providers to increase their costs via capital
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expenditures would result in a more reasonable rate of increase in healthcare
expenditures.
However, the evidence that CON programs result in lower costs is limited and
dated, and there exists some research indicating that CON programs may in fact
lead to higher costs. For example, a 2007 study of 1,957 acute care hospitals (based
on 1991 data) showed that healthcare costs were, on average, higher in states with
CON programs.171 Additional studies have come to similar conclusions. A more
rigorous 2010 study, which controlled for more variables than in prior research
(e.g., the stringency of a state’s CON program), found no statistically significant
correlation between the existence of a CON program and cost per hospital
admission in a state, and a statistically significant positive correlation between the
stringency of a state’s CON program and the cost per admission. 172 In essence the
authors concluded that CON programs not only failed to correlate to lower costs,
they might actually lead to higher costs per admission.173 Similarly, evidence
suggests that when services such as MRI machines and acute care beds are
regulated, patients tend to pay more for these services.174 While a 2014 study found
lower hospital cost-inefficiency in CON states than non-CON states, as FTC
Commissioner Ohlhausen observed, that particular study did not control for the
possibility that the observed differences could be caused by many other differences
between states without CON laws, such as market and environmental
characteristics, factors which were addressed in the 2010 study.175
In addition, studies appear to contradict fears about a flooding of the market
with unnecessary services following a repeal of CON laws. For example, a 1998
study found no evidence of a surge in acquisition of facilities or in costs following
removal of CON regulations.176 The same study found that mature CON programs
were not associated with a significant reduction in per capita costs.177 And a 2003
study showed that states that repealed their CON laws did not experience
significant growth in either nursing home or long-term care costs.178 When viewed
171
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as a whole, this evidence casts considerable doubt on the proposition that CON
programs lead to reduced healthcare expenditures or that their repeal leads to a
surge in unnecessary services in the market.
ii. The Evidence That CON Programs Improve Access to Care is Weak
Although some argue that modernizing CON will decrease access to health
services, evidence does not appear to support this conclusion, at least when using
supply of services as a proxy for access. Admittedly, supply of services is an
imprecise metric at best, because the fact that providers are located in a given
geographic area does not mean that they are willing to provide services to all
patients—the difficulty that the uninsured and patients with Medicaid have finding
care, relative to those with private insurance, is well-documented.179 Nonetheless,
when using supply as a proxy for access, the evidence seems to support the
conclusion that CON programs restrict access to care. For example, a 2014 study
by George Mason University showed that while the average state has 362 hospital
beds per 100,000 population, this number falls to 263 hospital beds per 100,000
population in states with CON programs.180 In states that regulate acute care beds,
this number falls to 131 beds per 100,000 population, and this number drops by an
average of 4.7 beds for each additional service regulated. 181 While limited in scope
and rigor, this evidence suggests that the presence of CON programs reduces the
capacity of health facilities, and that this effect permeates beyond the regulated
services. Thus, restrictive CON programs may decrease access to health services.
Similarly, CON proponents argue that the program’s support increased access to
care for the indigent, via the cross-subsidization principle described above.182 When
repeal of CON laws is proposed, CON supporters warn of an influx of for-profit
providers who will cherry-pick the more lucrative, privately insured patients,
leaving the nonprofit hospitals with the lower-paying insured patients and the
uninsured, ultimately leading to a decrease in the provision of care for the
indigent.183 A recent study, however, found no evidence that CON programs
increase the amount of indigent care provided in a state. 184
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iii. The Relationship Between CON and Quality of Care is Unclear
Proponents of CON programs argue that such programs improve quality by
ensuring an adequate volume of patients. And indeed, this argument is based on
reliable evidence showing that increased volume of patients does lead to improved
outcomes in hospital settings.185 This is easy to understand—especially when
considering, for example, that surgeons who repeatedly perform highly complex,
specialized procedures are likely to be better at those procedures than surgeons who
perform the same procedure only intermittently.186 Thus, evidence has shown that
patients experience better outcomes in hospitals with expertise (usually measured as
higher volume) in particular procedures.187 Importantly, however, this
demonstrated link between volume and quality appears to be independent of the
existence of a CON program in a state. Moreover, some evidence suggests that
stringent CON programs decrease the quality of care in many settings. For
example, a 1988 study of 1,000 hospitals showed higher mortality rates in hospitals
in states with stringent CON programs. 188 However, a 2002 study assessing riskadjusted mortality rates and hospital volumes for Medicare patients undergoing a
coronary artery bypass graft (“CABG”) in states with and without CON laws found
higher mortality rates in states without certificate of need regulation. 189 In addition,
the same study found that repeal of certificate of need regulations during the study
period was associated with declines in hospital volume for CABG surgery. 190 A
2007 study examining whether rates of appropriate cardiac catheterization after
admission for heart attack varied between states with and without CON regulation
of cardiac catheterization found that “CON regulation was associated with
modestly lower rates of equivocally and weakly indicated [(a scientific way of saying
“potentially unnecessary”)] cardiac catheterization after admission for [heart
attack], but [found] no significant differences in rates of strongly indicated
catheterization.”191
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More recently, a 2009 study found that states that had dropped CON
regulations had lower mortality rates for CABG surgery than states that kept their
CON programs.192 The study concluded that this effect may be the result of the
increased fragmentation of care that results from CON programs. 193 Even a simple
analysis conducted solely for illustrative purposes in this paper examining the
likelihood of hospital penalization under the Medicare program 194 in states with
and without CON programs shows that hospitals in CON states are approximately
50% more likely to be penalized than those in non-CON states.195 As Figure 1
describes, the average percentage of hospitals that were penalized in states with a
CON program was 57.6% , while the average percentage of hospitals penalized in
states without a CON program was only 38%, a considerable difference.196 Again,
this simple analysis does not show that CON programs cause hospitals to be
penalized; however, the higher rate of penalization in CON states does raise
questions for further study in view of prior research on the relationship between
quality of care and CON laws.
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Overall, the evidence does not support a conclusion that CON programs
improve the quality of patient care, and there exist significant questions deserving
of further research regarding the relationship between CON and quality of care.
iv. The Influence of Politics on Certificate of Need Programs
As noted above, stakeholders have consistently identified political influence as a
barrier to effective administration of CON programs. Indeed, many stakeholders
believe that the political process has prevented CON programs from achieving
their objectives, rather than the regulation of the supply of healthcare facilities. For
example, a 2009 qualitative study conducted by researchers at the Center for
Studying Health System Change (“HSC”) seemed to confirm the influence of
politics on the CON process.197 The researchers characterized modern CON
programs as “an arena where providers often battle for service-line dominance and
market share,” rather than a neutral process designed to maximize health system
efficiency.198
The study included interviews with respondents from six states with CON laws
(Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, South Carolina, and Washington), and
197
198

See Yee, et al., supra note 81, at 1, 2–3.
Id. at 1.

232

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. I05

although stakeholder views varied widely about the effectiveness of CON
regulations on access, quality and costs, there was consensus “[i]n five of the six
states studied—all except Michigan—the CON approval process can be highly
subjective and tends to be influenced heavily by political relationships rather than
policy objectives.”199 In particular, respondents believed factors such as a provider’s
clout, organizational size, or overall wealth and resources, played more of a role in
CON decisions than policy objectives.200 Moreover, state CON officials reported
that although the basic function of their job was to process and review applications,
they were often “caught in the competitive crossfire between providers during
appeals, public hearings and legislative battles.”201 Hospitals tended to view the
process primarily through a competitive lens, using the process to protect existing
market share, either geographic or by service line, and to block competitors from
entering their markets.202 However, the researchers noted that hospitals find the
CON process onerous if they are attempting to enter a market.203 Confirming the
anticompetitive nature of the process, one hospital respondent said, “[o]nce you
have the franchise, you are happy to stop others from having it.” 204
While the study respondents were fairly unequivocal about the shortcomings of
CON programs, most still believed that they were better off with CON in place.205
One state hospital association respondent noted that while member hospitals
initially had mixed views about the benefits of CON, they “banded together to
support the process after realizing it was a valuable tool to block new physicianowned facilities.”206 Thus, rather than repeal, respondents concluded that CON
programs should remain in place but would benefit from resource and process
improvements, including “increased funding for evaluation, improved compliance
monitoring and movement toward a process driven more by data and planning
rather than political influence.”207 The authors found that respondents believed
certain aspects of the Michigan process helped insulate decision making from
politics, including a division of responsibility between setting CON review
standards (done by an appointed commission that included many different
stakeholders) and the actual review of CON applications (conducted by the state
Department of Community Health).208
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III. THE ABILITY OF CON PROGRAMS TO SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
It is not for lack of legal challenge that CON programs remain in place.
Opponents have attempted a number of constitutional and other challenges to the
laws, but courts have refused to overturn them.
The most obvious and common line of challenge to CON laws is under the
Commerce Clause. In Colon Health Centers of America v. Hazel, out-of-state
providers of medical imaging services challenged Virginia’s CON law under the
dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.209 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
challenge and affirmed the district court, which found that the law neither
discriminated nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. 210 The court
first reiterated the well-known standard that a statute that is facially discriminatory
or discriminatory in purpose or effect may survive strict scrutiny only if it “advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”211 While the parties agreed the statute was not
facially discriminatory, plaintiffs argued that it was discriminatory in purpose, with
a primary goal to shelter existing providers (all of whom were, by definition, instate) from competition at the expense of out-of-state businesses seeking entry into
the market.212 Rejecting this argument, the court noted that Virginia’s CON law
served a number of “legitimate public purposes: improving healthcare quality by
discouraging the proliferation of underutilized facilities, enabling underserved and
indigent populations to access necessary medical services, and encouraging costeffective consumer spending.”213 Accordingly, the court said it could not “discern a
sinister protectionist purpose in this straightforward effort to bring medical care to
all the citizens of the Commonwealth in the most efficient and professional
manner.”214
Turning to the question of whether the law was discriminatory in effect, the
court was equally unconvinced. Plaintiffs alleged that Virginia’s law “systematically
advantage[d] established in-state providers at the expense of new, primarily out-ofstate firms,” by impermissibly granting current providers “the authority to thwart
the market entrance of out-of-state providers” through participation in the
adversarial process as applications were evaluated (existing providers could oppose
applications by new entrants at a hearing) and by allowing existing providers to file
competing applications to block the approval of new entrants.215 The court
evaluated these claims with regard to whether the plaintiffs demonstrated that
209
210
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Virginia’s CON law, “if enforced, would negatively impact interstate commerce to
a greater degree than intrastate commerce,” in considering whether the CON law
“erects a special barrier to market entry by non-domestic entities,”216 but concluded
that plaintiffs had not shown that they faced a special hardship compared to instate providers.217 The court noted repeatedly that CON programs are generally
policy decisions that are properly the purview of legislators, and although the
plaintiffs were frustrated by legislative policy, the court declined to take the
“potentially limitless step of striking down every state regulatory program that has
some alleged adverse effect on market competition.”218 As the court observed, “[w]e
live in such an interconnected economy that for any regulation some effects are
almost bound to be felt out of state. To accept appellants’ arguments ‘would
broaden the negative Commerce Clause beyond its existing scope.’”219
Having rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, the court determined that the law
survived a rational basis review by balancing the putative local benefits against the
incidental burdens on state commerce, as required by the Supreme Court in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).220 Virginia had put forth a number of
rational reasons in support of its CON program, among them the many
justifications described above—improvement in healthcare quality, indigent care,
ensuring appropriate distribution of services across geographic areas, and even
healthcare cost reduction.221 Fundamentally, the court believed that the decision
over the merits of CON was a legislative one, observing that while “[t]he battle
between laissez fairists and regulators is as old as the hills,” these disputes are “more
often over economics and politics than over law.”222 Moreover, the court noted,
“[l]egislators, not jurists, are best able to compare competing economic theories and
sets of data and then weigh the result against their own political valuations of the
public interests at stake.”223
Other circuits have ruled similarly. While there was brief excitement among
those who oppose CON following the 2011 ruling in Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp.
v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health (“Yakima I ”), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld
the dismissal of Sherman Act restraint of trade claims but remanded to the district
court to consider a dormant Commerce Clause claim, the feeling was short-lived,
as the district court granted summary judgment on the commerce clause claim and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2013.224 In Yakima II the plaintiff challenged
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regulations related to scheduled, or “elective,” percutaneous coronary interventions
(“PCIs”), which are nonsurgical procedures used to treat coronary heart disease. 225
Under the Washington state CON law, elective PCIs could be performed only at
hospitals with a minimum annual volume of 300 procedures. 226 Yakima Valley
Memorial Hospital claimed that the CON requirement lacked a reasonable basis
and that its putative benefits were outweighed by the burden on interstate
commerce, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 227 However, similarly to
the court in Colon Health Centers, the Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding that
the regulation survived the Pike balancing test.228 “Accepting as true [Yakima
Valley] Memorial’s arguments and evidence, the burden on interstate commerce is
obviously too minor and remote to create a ‘substantial burden’ under Pike.”229
Moreover, the court found that Washington officials had made a reasonable
determination in establishing the minimum threshold—acknowledging that courts
normally would end the inquiry after determining that the burden on interstate
commerce was insignificant, the Yakima II court nonetheless examined and
decisively rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the safety benefits derived from the
threshold established by Washington state were illusory or nonexistent.230
The only case in which a court has invalidated a CON law under a Commerce
Clause theory appears to be a 2005 case addressing Puerto Rico’s CON program as
applied to pharmacies. In Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, the First Circuit found that
Puerto Rico’s CON program impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state
pharmacies, based in large part on the fact that Puerto Rico had exempted all of its
existing pharmacies from the certificate requirements when the law was enacted
(over 92% of which were locally owned), along with significant disparities in
treatment of in-state pharmacies and those from out of state. 231 The court
explained:
While the Secretary has rejected virtually no unopposed
applications, twenty-three percent of opposed applications have
been denied. The negative effects on out-of-Commonwealth
applicants have been particularly pronounced. Over fifty percent
of out-of-Commonwealth entities have been forced to undergo
the entire administrative process compared to less than twenty-
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Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Enforcement of the CON regulations does not violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). The Madarang court also rejected a
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five percent of local applicants. Moreover, of those applicants
forced to endure the hearing process, the Secretary has granted
certificates to ninety percent of the local applicants but only to
fifty-eight percent of out-of-Commonwealth applicants.232
Moreover, the court observed that since the law was enacted in 1979, the
percentage of locally owned pharmacies had actually increased, from 92% to 94%,
which the court believed was a strong indicator that the CON law as applied had
“limited competition in favor of the predominantly local group of existing
pharmacies.”233
Several factors caution against extrapolation of the court’s ruling in Rullan to
other CON laws. First, the court found that the primary—and perhaps only—
justification the state official gave for denying a certificate was that permitting a
new entrant would “cause undue competition for existing facilities.” 234 This is
distinct from the justifications offered in the Yakima II and Colon Health, where
states carefully described and documented a litany of policy objectives their CON
programs were designed to achieve. Indeed, the Yakima II court distinguished
Rullan on the ground that the Puerto Rico statute in effect protected local
pharmacies from out-of-state competition, which was unlike the situation in
Yakima II, where the in-state hospital was seeking to offer the same service that
was already offered by a provider owned by an out-of-state parent.235 Second, as
described above, in Rullan there were considerable disparities in the treatment of
and outcomes for out-of-state applicants.236 The court in Colon Health believed
this to be a meaningful distinction between the two cases.237 Indeed, it does not
appear that any CON laws have been invalidated in whole or in part since Rullan.
A final case worth mentioning involves the 1997 invalidation of Iowa’s CON
law as applied to abortion facilities. In Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v.
Atchison, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that
requiring the plaintiff to undergo the CON review process amounted to a
substantial and unconstitutional burden on the right of access to abortion. 238
Applying Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v. Casey,239 the court recognized that
CON laws serve legitimate purposes and are constitutional if they impose only the
“incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion” and do not “otherwise impose an undue burden on one’s ability to obtain
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an abortion.”240 However, the court found that state officials subjected plaintiffs to
the CON requirement solely because they intended to provide abortion services,
and that similarly situated facilities that did not provide abortion services had
consistently been exempted from the CON requirement. 241 As with Rullan, the
highly specific circumstances of this case caution against attempts to generalize to
other challenges to CON laws.
Thus, it appears that CON programs are firmly established in the thirty-five
states where they have not been repealed, and will be upheld by courts in the
absence of blatantly protectionist measures. Those inclined to reform CON will
have to undertake these efforts via the legislative and regulatory process, as courts
have steadfastly refused to interject themselves into policy decisions with regard to
the structure of state healthcare delivery systems.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF NEED IN THE POST-AFFORDABLE CARE ERA:
A CASE STUDY FROM KENTUCKY

A. The Changing Healthcare Landscape:
The Affordable Care Act and Value-Based Payment
The United States’ healthcare system has changed tremendously in the past
decade, driven by a number of factors, the most significant of which are the ACA
and the related move toward so-called “value-based payment.”242 On March 23,
2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law.243 The ACA was intended to
provide all persons in the United States with guaranteed access to affordable
healthcare by fixing the “patchwork” United States system, filling in gaps in the
existing framework by: eliminating the ability of insurance companies to
discriminate based on pre-existing conditions and strictly limiting pricing based on
age; requiring individuals who lack access to an affordable employer-based
insurance option to purchase private insurance (with subsidies for individuals from
100 to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”); and expanding eligibility for
Medicaid to include all adults with income less than 138% of the FPL.244
240

Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048, 1049.
Id. at 1046.
242
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat.
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If the ACA was fully implemented, the overwhelming majority of United States
residents245 would be able to access affordable healthcare, with thirty-two million
people projected to acquire insurance after implementation at the time the law was
passed.246 The ACA has been tremendously controversial and the subject of
multiple lawsuits, including National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law’s
individual mandate provision but ruled that states had the option whether to
expand their Medicaid programs to cover individuals below 138% of the FPL. 247
Although states have varied significantly in their implementation of the ACA, 248
the United States has seen a material expansion of insurance coverage since the
law’s primary coverage provisions came into effect in 2014, with an estimated 20
million individuals obtaining insurance coverage. 249
Thus, the healthcare landscape has altered significantly—for example, in
Kentucky, the rate of uncompensated care provided by hospitals has dropped
sharply since the ACA, reflecting that many individuals who were formerly
uninsured are now covered by Medicaid or private insurance plans.250 These
changes have implications for CON programs. In particular, one of the historic
justifications for continuation of CON programs has been, in essence, that
providers, especially safety-net hospitals, require protection from competition in
order to maintain sufficiently profitable services (from privately insured patients) to
subsidize the uncompensated care that they provide to the indigent. 251 This
rationale is materially less persuasive when the poor are now insured via Medicaid,

245
Under the Affordable Care Act, undocumented residents are neither eligible for the Medicaid
expansion nor federal subsidies to purchase insurance via the exchanges established under the Affordable
Care Act. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3) (2016) (stating that the mandate does not apply to undocumented
immigrants); Affordable Care Act § 1312(f)(3) (banning undocumented immigrants from purchasing
insurance via exchanges). In addition, the law bans undocumented residents from purchasing insurance
on the exchanges solely at their own expense. Id.
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which allows hospitals and other providers to be reimbursed for the services they
provide.
Similarly, the federal government has led a movement away from “fee for
service” (“FFS”) reimbursement, in which healthcare providers are reimbursed for
specific services they provide without reference to the quality of those services,
whether the service was truly necessary, or the patient outcome as a result of the
service. Recognizing that the FFS system created economically undesirable
incentives for healthcare providers and failed to reward higher quality providers for
delivering efficient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
has undertaken a robust effort to reform the way in which the Medicare program
pays for healthcare services. CMS has several value-based payment programs, some
optional and others mandatory, and this Article will not describe them in detail.252
For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to observe that under these value-based
payment programs, healthcare providers who treat Medicare patients (which is
most healthcare providers in the United States)253 either currently or will soon
receive at least a portion of their payment under a payment system that
incorporates measures of the value of the care delivered. Before the ACA, almost
no Medicare payments were made under value-based payment models. However,
the payment landscape has changed dramatically in the past several years. For
example, since 2012, CMS has penalized hospitals a portion of their Medicare
reimbursements if they fail to meet quality standards with regard to the rate of
readmission following certain procedures.254
The Obama Administration has established aggressive goals to increase the
percentage of Medicare payments that are made under value-based structures; the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which oversees CMS, has
set a goal of tying 30% of FFS Medicare payments to quality or value through
alternative payment models by the end of 2016,255 and tying 50% of payments to
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Interested readers should visit the CMS website to learn more about value-based payment. See
Are Value-Based Programs?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
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253
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these models by the end of 2018.256 In addition, HHS also established a “goal of
tying 85 percent of all traditional Medicare payments to quality or value by 2016
and 90 percent by 2018 through programs such as the Hospital Value Based
Purchasing and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Programs.” 257 Given that
Medicare comprises a large share of the healthcare expenditures in the United
States (approximately 20% in 2014),258 the flow-through effects on the business
models of healthcare providers can be expected to be significant as private insurers
and eventually state Medicaid plans follow suit.259
In short, the post-ACA healthcare market looks very different. This is true
whether a state has embraced healthcare reform or resisted it. Accordingly, the
historic rationale for CON programs, much of which rested on a foundation of (1)
a large uninsured population requiring significant uncompensated care from
providers and (2) a market in which providers were reimbursed under a FFS
payment structure, must now be reexamined in view of the shifted coverage and
payment landscape. Policy objectives such as cost containment via supply
restrictions (on the theory that a bed built is a bed filled) and preventing
overutilization of high-cost services are significantly less relevant when payment is
based on the value of the service delivered rather than the quantity of services
provided. Similarly, enabling cross-subsidization of profitable services to support
the provision of indigent care becomes less necessary when the uninsured
population is significantly reduced.

B. Case Study: Modernization of the CON Program in Kentucky
In Kentucky, as in the thirty-five other states that retain CON programs, there

256
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has been no political will for repeal of the CON laws among either party. 260 There
was widespread acknowledgement among policymakers and stakeholders, however,
that the CON program was ripe for modernization in view of the changing
coverage and payment landscapes.261 Accordingly, the administration of Governor
Steven L. Beshear undertook a thorough examination of Kentucky’s CON program
to identify ways to evolve the program to meet the needs of the post-ACA
environment.262
i. Kentucky’s Certificate of Need Program Prior to the Affordable Care Act
Kentucky first enacted CON laws in 1972.263 Since that time, the program has
undergone minor revisions, such as a 2012 amendment that exempted certain longterm care facilities from the certificate of need process.264 Today, Kentucky requires
most types of healthcare providers to obtain a certificate of need before providing
health services. These services include the following:265




Acute hospital beds
Comprehensive rehabilitation
Inpatient psychiatric facilities





Ambulatory surgical centers
Chemical dependency centers
Private duty nursing








Residential psychiatric facilities
Nursing facilities
Home health agencies
Hospice services
Residential hospice services
Cardiac catheterization services








Neonatal care centers
Open heart programs
Transplant programs
Magnetic resonance imaging
Positron emission tomography
Megavoltage radiation equipment

260
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The process by which a potential provider can obtain a CON in Kentucky is
governed by both statute266 and regulation.267 The Cabinet for Health and Family
Services is empowered, under KRS § 216B.040(3)(e) and the pursuant regulations,
to create a procedure to review CON applications.268 The Cabinet must review
applications that require formal review within ninety days of issuing a public notice
regarding a hearing. 269 The ninety-day review period follows the date of public
notice, which gives interested parties notice that an application is being reviewed.270
Applications are reviewed in batches, with applications for similar services being
reviewed together.271 Hearings are conducted by administrative law judges, who
enter a final decision on behalf of the Cabinet. 272 Decisions of the administrative
law judges may be reviewed by state circuit courts.273A hearing may or may not be
requested by affected parties after the public notice.274 At a hearing, affected
parties—including, but not limited to, the original applicant—may participate.275
Whether a party is “affected” has been the subject of litigation. For example, a
Kentucky court found that a hospital lacked standing to challenge the application
of a birthing center, because the services provided for childbearing at the hospital
were materially different than those at a birthing center.276 But, affected parties
often include other health service providers in the area.277
When formally reviewing CON applications, the Cabinet looks to ensure that
applications meet criteria described in section 216B.040(2)(a) of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes and title 900, section 6:065 of the Kentucky Administrative
Regulations. These criteria place the burden on an applicant to produce evidence of
five criteria,278 described in Figure 2, below:

266

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.010-990 (West 2016).
See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020, 6:020–6:130 (2016).
268
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(3)(e) (West 2016).
267

269

900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:065, 6:090 (2016).
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:065 (2016).
271
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.062 (West 2016).
272
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:090 (2016).
273
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.115(1) (West 2016).
274
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.085 (West 2016).
270

275

Id.

276

Visitation Birth & Family Wellness Ctr., Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., No. 13CI-01013
(Ky.
Cir.
Feb.
23,
2015),
http://birthmonopoly.com/bmp/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Circuit-Court-Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5S-9GL4].
277

Id.

278

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.040(2)(a) (West 2016).

2016–2017

Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era

243

Figure 2. Summary of Certificate of Need Requirements in Kentucky279
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ii. The Need for Modernization of the CON Program
As described in Section IV.A. above, the healthcare environment in the United
States has undergone enormous changes in the past decade, particularly since
enactment of the ACA.280 In Kentucky, it was apparent that one of the most
important changes likely to result from the implementation of the ACA was an
279
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increase in the number of individuals accessing health services over ensuing years,
particularly immediately following the expansion of insurance coverage to more
Kentucky residents.281 As part of its ACA implementation effort, Kentucky
contracted with an independent consulting firm to conduct a thorough review of
Kentucky’s healthcare facility capacity to determine whether Kentucky had in place
the healthcare infrastructure to meet the current and anticipated future need for
services for its residents (the “Facility Capacity Study”).282
The Facility Capacity Study had several important findings. Among them,
projections of changes in healthcare utilization rates as a majority of the 640,000
uninsured Kentuckians (prior to January 1, 2014, when the ACA’s insurance
coverage provisions became effective), gained coverage either through Medicaid
expansion or private health insurance in the years following ACA
implementation.283 The study concluded that the shift in coverage would result in a
shift in utilization, with the use of inpatient services increasing by 6% and the use
of outpatient services increasing by 3% by 2017.284 The study identified several
shortcomings in Kentucky’s existing delivery system. In particular, the study
documented excess capacity in acute care settings (inpatient hospital beds),
projecting a decline of as much as 5% in the demand for inpatient acute care by
2017, even after accounting for impacts of population growth and coverage
expansion due to the ACA.285 The study also observed that the national use rate for
outpatient surgery was 56% higher than the Kentucky rate; similarly, ambulatory
surgical facilities in the Commonwealth were experiencing high utilization.286 The
study also projected a need for additional home health capacity in order to meet a
projected 14% increase in demand for home health services.287 Finally, the study
found a need for more home and community based services to support the
transition of patient care from facilities to the community. 288
Unsurprisingly, the study concluded that the Commonwealth’s CON program
has slowed health facility expansion, and identified ambulatory surgical centers as a
particular example of this artificially slowed growth.289 Of the forty-three
applications for ambulatory surgical center CONs since 2003, two were approved,
eighteen were denied, revoked, deferred or withdrawn, and twenty-three were
approved under a nonsubstantive review process, an expedited process that applies
only in limited circumstances.290 The ASC applicants approved under the
281
282

DELOITTE, supra note 260, at 11.
Id. at 7.

283

Id.
Id. at 18–19.
285
Id. at 27.
286
Id. at 45–46.
287
Id. at 71.
288
Id. at 77–78.
289
Id. at 58.
290
Id. at 109; see also 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 6:075 (2016) (providing for nonsubstantive review);
284

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.015(18) (West 2016) (defining “nonsubstantive review”).

2016–2017

Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era

245

nonsubstantive review process consisted largely of applications from facilities with
existing CONs who sought to make minor changes to their facilities, such as
location and cost escalations on existing projects.291 Thus, the evidence in the
report suggested that of the twenty new providers seeking to enter the health
market, 90% were denied entry.292
The Facility Capacity Study contained a number of recommendations, several
of which related to the Kentucky CON program. Given a documented need for
additional home health services, the study recommended that the Commonwealth
consider the discontinuation of the requirement that home health agencies obtain a
CON.293 The study documented excess capacity and market distortion resulting
from partial regulation of MRIs (only certain MRI providers were required to
obtain CON approval; others who already possessed a CON for MRIs could add
another MRI machine without obtaining a CON); accordingly, the study
recommended that the Commonwealth consider discontinuing the CON program
for certain types of imaging, including MRIs.294 In view of the shortage of
ambulatory surgery capacity described above, the study also recommended possible
suspension, discontinuation, or relaxation of the CON program in relation to
ambulatory surgery centers.295
iii. The Modernization Process in Kentucky
Rather than simply accepting the recommendations of the Facility Capacity
Study, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services undertook a year-long process
of stakeholder input and revision to the existing State Health Plan, which outlines

291
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the numerical need criteria by which applications are assessed. 296 On October 8,
2014, the Cabinet announced its intention to critically review Kentucky’s CON
program.297 As a first step, the Cabinet identified seven guiding principles for the
modernization process, described in Figure 3 below, with an overarching vision of
identifying reforms that would enable Kentucky to develop a health system that
could achieve the so-called “Triple Aim: better value, better care, and population
health improvement.”298 Stakeholders were invited to submit comments in writing
or at either of two listening sessions held by Cabinet officials, and the Cabinet
requested that proposals specifically identify how they would further one or more of
the goals outlined in the guiding principles.299
Figure 3. Summary of Guiding Principles of Kentucky CON Modernization300


Supporting the Evolution of Care Delivery. The trend is decisively away
from a high-overhead acute/inpatient model to an outpatient-centric model.
Thus, the CON program will seek to give healthcare facilities the ability to
respond to market trends in a timely fashion, enabling the continued service
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subject to biennial budget authorizations and limitations, and with consideration given to the proposal's
impact on healthcare costs in the Commonwealth.” Id. Thus, all applications are first evaluated for
consistency with the State Health Plan, which contains formulas and other criteria to determine
whether there is a documented need for a particular service. Id. However, there is also a separate and
additional review criterion called “need and accessibility,” which requires proposals to “meet an
identified need in a defined geographic area and be accessible to all residents of the area.” Id. Critics of
the CON program documented many instances in which the State Health Plan formula showed that a
service was needed, yet existing providers opposed an application on the ground that they could meet
the existing need without introduction of a new provider into the market. See, e.g., Public Hearing on

900 KAR 5:020 and 900 KAR 1:055 Before the Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and
Family Servs. 20 (June 22, 2015, 9:00 AM) (statement of Brian Lebanion, Professional Home
Healthcare Agency, Inc. & Friends and Companions Adult Day Care Health). Applications were
routinely denied on this ground (failure to prove need and accessibility), yet there exists no enforcement
mechanism to ensure that the additional need will in fact be met by existing providers. Id. For that
reason, the state considered issuing a new regulation pursuant to which providers who demonstrated
consistency with the State Health Plan would receive a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the
“need and accessibility” criteria; however, this regulation was withdrawn prior to the end of the Beshear
administration. See 900 KY. ADMIN REGS. 6:070 (filed Aug. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM) (amended after
comments),
http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/8ED9C4F8-5241-41F2-AE93918BE794C934/0/900KAR6070AmendedafterCommentsCONconsiderationsforformalreview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VKJ-ZC6T].
297
Special Memorandum from Ky. Cabinet, supra note 261.
298

Id.
Id.
300
Id.
299
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of local communities in a changing healthcare environment.
 Incentivizing Development of a Full Continuum of Care. Better care,
increased value and improved population health depend on an integrated
continuum of care in which providers communicate with each other and
ensure that patients receive timely, coordinated care in an appropriate
setting. Payment structures are evolving to reflect these goals; therefore, the
CON program will work to promote and support providers and facilities
that seek to develop a robust continuum of care alone or in partnership with
others.
 Incentivizing Quality. Healthcare is rapidly moving toward adoption of
objective quality metrics. Thus, the CON program will seek to support those
providers that demonstrate attainment of robust quality indicators.
 Improving Access to Care. For a number of reasons, Medicaid members
have, on average, a more challenging path toward access to care. Thus, the
CON program will seek to incorporate strategies that will incentivize greater
access to care for Medicaid members, the newly insured and the remaining
uninsured.
 Improving Value of Care. As healthcare transitions from a fee-for-service
model to a value-based purchasing framework, payers will continue to seek
evidence of value in health services. Thus, the CON program will seek to
incentivize both price transparency and demonstrable value from health
professionals and facilities.
 Promoting Adoption of Efficient Technology. Increased adoption of
technologies such as electronic medical records, participation in information
sharing platforms such as the Kentucky Health Information Exchange, and
participation in large-scale data projects such as an All Payer Claims
Database are critical elements of a modernized, higher quality and more
efficient health system. Thus, the CON program will seek to incentivize
adoption of technologies deemed to further improve value in Kentucky’s
health system.
 Exempting Services for which CON is no longer necessary. Kentucky
regulates via CON many services that even CON states exempt. Thus,
Office of Health Policy will seek to focus on strategies to modernize
Kentucky’s CON program to be more reflective of modern healthcare
trends.
iv. Stakeholder Input on CON Modernization
More than fifty individuals and organizations attended the listening sessions,
and written comments were submitted by nearly sixty discrete entities representing
hundreds of stakeholders, including large statewide organizations such as the
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Kentucky Hospital Association, the Kentucky Primary Care Association, the
Kentucky Association of Healthcare Facilities, and many others.301 Key themes
from the comments are consistent with those that have been identified in other
states: allowing for provision of indigent care, supporting higher quality services via
the prevention of excess market dilution, promotion of market stability, and
helping to contain costs. Key themes from select stakeholder groups are
summarized below.302






301

Comments from Hospitals: Comments from hospitals and hospital
associations tended to be supportive of the current CON program and
opposed to significant changes. These comments focused on the stability
provided by the CON program and questioned whether CON
modernization was necessary to achieve healthcare innovation. Yet several
comments suggested piecemeal policy changes to improve the CON
program, such as exempting diagnostic modalities like MRIs from CON
requirements. Other suggested policy changes included providing
preferential treatment for CON applicants who will serve a designated
number of Medicaid patients and requiring health facilities to disclose
information about proposed prices in the CON application process in an
effort to promote price transparency and competition.
Comments from Community–Based Service Providers: Home and
community–based health providers were split on the necessity of
continuing the CON program for these services. While some commented
on the importance of maintaining the program, others noted that CON
should be limited to high–risk projects with a large capital investment, a
category that does not include services such as home health. Many long–
term care providers expressed the belief that it is important to continue to
regulate long–term care via CON. These providers made several
suggestions about how to modify the CON program to achieve the
Cabinet’s goals, including exemptions to allow providers to shift beds from
low–utilization service areas to high–utilization service areas without
submitting an additional application.
Comments from Other Stakeholders: Other stakeholders–including
professional organizations, industry groups, and charitable foundations–
offered a variety of comments regarding the CON modernization process.
Many of these comments suggested exempting certain services, such as
birth centers and home health services, from the CON application

See generally CON Modernization, KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH & FAM. SERVS.,
http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/con/conmod.htm [https://perma.cc/5V6B-DNVN] (last updated July 14,
2015) (containing links to the written comments received and links to videos of the listening sessions).
302
For full stakeholder online comments, see CON Modernizations Comments , KY. CABINET FOR
HEALTH & FAM. SERVS., http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/con/conres.htm [https://perma.cc/6K8LXZA4] (last updated Mar. 30, 2015).
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process. These comments also emphasized the importance that the
Cabinet proceed cautiously with CON modernization so as to ensure that
all changes reflect existing evidence and current patient need.
v. The Reforms to the CON Program
In May 2015, the Cabinet proposed several reforms to the CON process via a
revised State Health Plan, which became effective in October 2016. These reforms
can broadly be lumped into three categories: use of uniform review criteria to
promote increased use of electronic medical records and health information
exchanges; exemption of certain services from the State Health Plan; and
preferential treatment for providers who meet certain objective quality metrics or
participate in value-based payment programs. 303

a. Uniform Review: Criteria for All Applications
The revised State Health Plan includes a requirement for all applicants for a
certificate of need to meet several criteria:





All new applicants are required to demonstrate a plan for indigent and
medically underserved patients in the proposed service area;
All applicants who propose to expand existing services (or add beds) are
required to document not only the existence of a signed participation
agreement with the Kentucky Health Information Exchange (KHIE),304 but
also active participation in the exchange via submission of summary of care
records and accessing of data and information from KHIE for care
coordination if the existing service has an electronic health record; and
All new providers must document the existence of a signed participation
agreement with KHIE and submit summary of care records as well as access
data and information from KHIE for care coordination within twelve (12)
months of licensure.305

303

900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2015), amended by 900 KY. A DMIN. REG. 5:020E (2016).
The Kentucky Health Information Exchange is a “common, secure electronic information
infrastructure,” which “meets national standards to ensure interoperability across various health systems
and connectivity to the National Health Information Network,” thereby affording healthcare providers
“the functionality to support preventive health and disease management through alerts, messaging and
other tools.” About KHIE, KY. HEALTH INFO. EXCHANGE, http://khie.ky.gov/Pages/aboutkhie.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K3WQ-42AH] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
305
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 §§ I.C., III.A., III.B., V.B. (2015), amended by 900 KY. ADMIN.
REGS. 5:020E (2016).
304
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Together, these provisions require providers to undertake meaningful participation
in KHIE, with the ultimate objective of increasing care coordination of patients.306
For example, if a patient arrives at a hospital, the hospital should be able to access
the patient’s medical records from other providers via KHIE, which should in
theory prevent medical errors and improve the ability of providers to provide
seamless, coordinated care.307 Moreover, these new criteria require all new providers
to use electronic medical records, as participation in KHIE is not possible without
them.308 Admittedly, healthcare providers already had considerable incentives to
increase their use of electronic medical records through the federal government’s
“Meaningful Use” initiative;309 however, the requirement under the revised State
Health Plan to use KHIE to both share and obtain patient records builds upon the
existing federal incentive by adding a more prescriptive element to the regulatory
landscape.310 In addition, the uniform review criteria maintain the preexisting
requirement for applicants to document a plan of care for the uninsured and
medically underserved.311

b. Removal of Certain Services from the State Health Plan
The revised State Health Plan removes two service categories from review:
adult day health programs and outpatient healthcare centers.312 The original
proposal by the Cabinet contemplated removing several other components from the
State Health Plan (ambulance services, chemical dependency treatment beds, and
MRI); however, in response to feedback from stakeholders, those proposals were
retracted (ambulance services and chemical dependency treatment beds) or
modified (MRI; see below).313 It is important to note, however, that the
306

See id.
See id.
308
See id.
309
See
307

generally Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives
[https://perma.cc/G7XE-APMX] (last updated Feb. 6, 2015); EHR Incentive Programs,
HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-incentive-programs
[https://perma.cc/NCV8-X6BL] (last updated Jan. 15, 2013).
310
See 900 KY. ADMIN. REG. 5:020 at iv (2016).
311
312

See id.
See generally id. Under the prior State Health Plan, an “Outpatient Healthcare Center” was

defined as “a public or private provider-based institution with permanent facilities on a single campus,
that is under the supervision of an organized medical staff and that is comprised of components for the
provision of primary care, ambulatory surgery, twenty–four (24) hour emergency care, and radiologic
and magnetic resonance imaging.” KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 57 (2013). At the time of the most
recent revision to the State Health Plan, there was only one “Outpatient Healthcare Center” in the
Commonwealth. KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., HEALTHCARE FACILITY
DIRECTORIES,
MISCELLANEOUS
DIRECTORIES
at
22
(Sept.
2016),
chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B18B4766-D692-4054-AF53D149D028868B/0/MiscellaneousDirectoryOctober2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWL4-RBXK].
313
See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 49–51, 57, 61.
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consequence of removal from the State Health Plan is not full exemption from the
CON process.314 Under Kentucky law, full exemption can be accomplished only by
legislation.315 Rather, removal moves the service category into a different, more
streamlined form of CON review called “nonsubstantive review,” pursuant to which
applications are reviewed monthly rather than batched semi-annually, and where
approval is more likely.316

c. Consistency With the State Health Plan for Providers Who Meet
Objective Quality Metrics or Participate in Value-Based Payment Programs
Most significantly, the revised State Health Plan creates new review criteria
that effectively preference providers who meet objective quality metrics or
participate in value-based payment programs. 317 Under prior State Health Plans,
providers normally had to demonstrate consistency with the plan by showing need
for a particular service under a numeric formula contained in the plan for most
health services.318 For example, under the prior plan, consistency with the State
Health Plan for home health services had been determined pursuant to a numeric
formula that required applicants who wished to open a new home health agency to
demonstrate a need for at least 250 additional patients as shown in calculations
conducted by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, or 125 additional
patients in the case of existing agencies who wished to expand operations into a
new service area. 319 In essence, if the Cabinet’s numerical calculations did not show
a need for a sufficient number of new patients, applications could not be approved
because it would not be possible to show consistency with the State Health Plan.
Under the new State Health Plan, existing home health agencies who achieve
specific quality ratings under rating systems established by CMS need not meet the
numeric formula for need describe above; rather, those agencies are deemed
consistent with the state health plan solely by virtue of attaining quality
standards.320 Similarly, a hospital that meets certain CMS quality thresholds can be
deemed consistent with the plan in recognition of input from hospitals that
establishing hospital-owned home health agencies would better allow them to
follow patients after discharge, ultimately improving quality and continuity of
care.321 In addition, the updated State Health Plan adds a provision deeming
314

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.061 (West 2016) (requiring a certificate of need for most new
health services and many expansions of existing services).
315
316

Id.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.095 (West 2016).
See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2016).
318
See 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 (2013).
319
Id. at 32–33.
320
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E at 36–37 (2016).
321
Id. at 36; see also KY. HOSP. ASS’N, STATE HEALTH PLAN COMMENTS (June 24, 2015),
chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/C78FBA9E-7DC3-4185-9EADD4CF9D2579A3/0/CommentsfromHospitals.pdf [https://perma.cc/443K-TCQR].
317
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certain providers consistent with the plan if they participate in federal value-based
payment programs.322
In the case of ambulatory surgery centers, the most hotly contested area in the
CON program,323 the updated State Health Plan added a provision allowing
hospitals that meet certain quality thresholds under CMS rankings to be deemed
consistent with the plan.324 In so doing, the plan attempts to provide a mechanism
for an increase in outpatient facilities, as recommended by the Facility Capacity
Study, while still being responsive to concerns of stakeholders about possible
market destabilization in the event of a flood in outpatient providers. Similarly,
nursing home providers have more flexibility under the revised plan. Under the
prior plan, it was exceptionally difficult for new beds to be approved, and there was
no ready mechanism for transfer of beds among providers. The revised plan
attempts to address that concern through the addition of a specific provision
enabling the transfer of nursing home beds, but only among providers who meet
specific CMS quality thresholds.325
Significantly, the revised plan attempts to facilitate the provision of high quality
cancer treatment in additional geographic areas of the Commonwealth, an issue of
particular importance given Kentucky’s historically high cancer rates.326 Under the
prior plan, applicants for megavoltage radiation services had to satisfy a formula
322
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 37 (2015), amended by 900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020E (2016)
(“[A]n application to home health services shall be consistent with this Plan if the application is
submitted by: (a) An entity or entities that comprise a Kentucky-based federally qualified Accountable
Care Organization (“ACO”) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program or the Next Generation
ACO Model . . . or (b) A licensed Kentucky home health agency which shares common management
and control with an entity that provides substantial health management services to a physician-led
Kentucky-based federally qualified Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”) under the Medicare
Shared Savings Program or the Next Generation ACO Model, to provide home health services within
counties in which attributed patients of such physician-led ACO reside . . . .”).
323
In an attempt to ensure that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services did not remove the
Ambulatory Surgical Center criteria from the State Health Plan, the Kentucky General Assembly
enacted the following as part of the 2014–2016 Biennium Budget legislation:

Health Facility Licensing: Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, the
document required under KRS 216B.015(28) [the State Health Plan] shall
contain a utilization-based need methodology which accounts for all sites of
service in the review of applications proposing the establishment of a facility to be
licensed under 902 KAR 20:106 [ASCs].
H.B. 235, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014), http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statrev/ACTS2014rs/0117.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XXM-NC24].
324
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 59 (2015).
325
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 33 (2015).
326
See 2015 Annual Report: Cancer Deaths, AMERICA’S HEALTH RANKINGS,
http://www.americashealthrankings.org/explore/2015-annual-report/measure/cancerdeaths/state/KY
[https://perma.cc/AME2-V7JK] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (ranking Kentucky 50th among states in
cancer deaths based on three-year average, age-adjusted number of deaths attributed to cancer per
100,000 population).
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demonstrating a projected need for a certain number of services. 327 While the
revised plan maintains that numerical formula, it also adds a specific provision
deeming applications from entities certified as Academic Comprehensive Cancer
Centers consistent with the plan.328 For example, under this new provision the
University of Kentucky Markey Cancer Center, a National Cancer Institute
designated entity,329 has a smoother pathway to offer its services in additional areas
of the state.330 In this way, Kentuckians may be able to stay closer to home to
receive cancer therapy. And finally, while MRI was not removed from the State
Health Plan following objections from stakeholders, a new provision was added to
the plan allowing for addition of new MRI services if the applicant demonstrates
that the new service is consistent with accreditation requirements of the American
College of Radiology.331
vi. Lessons Learned on the Relevance of Certificate of Need Programs in the
Post–ACA Environment: Promoting Modernization of
State Healthcare Delivery Systems
The question of the role of CON programs in the new healthcare world is not
new. As described in Part III above, others have questioned the value of CON
programs in view of shifting payment models and changing delivery landscapes.
And in the post-ACA era, these questions are magnified to a considerable degree,
as some have noted. For example, Pamela Smith considered whether the
Community Health Needs Assessment required of hospitals under ACA (in which
hospitals must document their community impact as part of retaining their taxexempt status)332 should be combined with need assessments conducted pursuant to
state CON programs, thereby saving money, time, and personnel resources.333 And
if HHS retains its commitment to value-based payment following the Obama

327
328
329

900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 48 (2013).
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 52 (2015).

See National Cancer Institute Designation, UK HEALTHCARE: MARKEY CANCER CTR.,
http://ukhealthcare.uky.edu/Markey/NCI/ [https://perma.cc/3LQX-3TBS] (last visited Nov. 13,
2016).
330
See
generally
Find
a
Cancer
Center,
NAT’L
CANCER
INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/research/nci-role/cancer-centers/find#Kentucky
[https://perma.cc/WVN9JC3W] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (showing that the Markey Cancer Center is the only NCI
designated center in Kentucky).
331
900 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:020 at 49–51 (2015).
332
26 U.S.C. § 501(r) (2016).
333
Pamela C. Smith & Kelly Noe, Is the Community Health Needs Assessment Replacing the
Certificate of Need?, J. HEALTHCARE FIN., June/July 2014, at 1, 3–6.
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administration, which seems likely,334 the need for modernization of CON laws to
enable providers to adapt to the new environment will only increase.
The call for full-scale repeal of CON programs has largely been unsuccessful
and seems likely to continue to fall on deaf ears among legislators in the states that
retain CON laws. A more successful strategy for health-oriented policymakers and
stakeholders is to embrace CON programs as an additional regulatory tool to drive
systematic change in healthcare delivery systems. The ability of healthcare
providers to respond to economic incentives is well documented, 335 and although
response varies depending on the design and strength of the incentive, the
introduction of a new, high-quality competitor into a market is undoubtedly a
powerful incentive for existing providers.336 And while admittedly, healthcare is not
a normal market, 337 there is no reason to believe that healthcare providers will be
unresponsive to incentives to expand their businesses into new geographic areas or
service lines.
To be clear, the requirement that healthcare providers demonstrate the quality
of the services they intended to provide as part of the CON application process is
not novel. Indeed, many states have quality requirements as part of their
programs.338 However, Kentucky appears to be the first state to include explicit
preferences for those providers who meet objective quality metrics or participate in
value-based payment models.339 And although these reforms have been in effect
only since late 2015 and are subject to change by a new gubernatorial
334
In a rare bipartisan move in 2015, Congress passed the Medicare Access & CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) to significantly reform Medicare payment, shifting incentives
to reward providers who participate in value-based payment programs. Medicare Access & CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87, 91–98, 105–07, 145 (2015).
335
See, e.g., Kevin Quinn, The 8 Basic Payment Methods in Healthcare, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 300, 300 (2015).
336
See, e.g., Anne Saker, St. Elizabeth Wages Battle over Christ Surgicenter , CINCINNATI POST
ENQUIRER, June 2, 2016, at A1 (describing fight between existing provider in Northern Kentucky and
Ohio hospital seeking to enter the market).
337
See Cauchi & Noble, supra note 1.
338
See, e.g., Certificate of Need (CON) Program Summary, ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC.
SERVS.,
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dhcs/pages/certificateofneed/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/783HM6HM] (last visited Nov. 13, 2016); see also CON-Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGIS. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6NJA-QDAZ] (referencing specific state CON statutes).
339
However, as part of its State Innovation Model Awards, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services is providing additional incentive for states to consider how they can align their regulatory
authorities, such as certificate of need to reinforce accountable care and delivery system transformation.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, C.F.D.A. NO. 93.624, STATE INNOVATION
MODELS: FUNDING FOR MODEL DESIGN AND TESTING ASSISTANCE (2012),
https://innovation.cms.gov/files/x/stateinnovation_foa.pdf [https://perma.cc/86UE-2WTF]. Indeed, as
a State Innovation Model Design Award grantee, Kentucky included in its final Model Design an intent
to leverage its regulatory authority, including the certificate of need program, to promote a move toward
delivery system transformation. Kentucky State Innovation Model (SIM), KY. CABINET FOR HEALTH
& FAM. SERVS., http://www.chfs.ky.gov/ohp/sim [https://perma.cc/3F9W-EQ3B] (last updated Nov.
1, 2016).
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administration, this novel approach to CON appears to be leading to expansion of
higher-quality services into new areas and service lines. Indeed, since Kentucky’s
new State Health Plan has become effective, many new providers have applied and
received approval to deliver services, and others are still navigating the process. 340
Over time, it is reasonable to expect that patients will gravitate to higher quality
providers and that existing providers will at least attempt to improve the quality of
the services they deliver in order to retain their existing market share. In this way, a
rising tide may lift all boats in the healthcare delivery system. Similarly, the
possibility of the expansion of service lines and into new geographic areas for
participation in value-based payment models, particularly when layered on top of
existing (and ever–increasing) federal pressure to participate in those models,
should incentivize at least some providers to embrace the changing landscape rather
than resist it. If that occurs, CON may regain a valuable role in shaping the
healthcare delivery system rather than serving primarily as an anti–competitive relic
whose repeal is prevented by political inertia and entrenched incumbents.
CONCLUSION
Certificate of need programs were conceived in a healthcare environment that is
essentially unrecognizable today. Every aspect of the healthcare landscape has
changed dramatically, from healthcare delivery systems to payment structures to the
insurance coverage models. These changes have been particularly magnified in the
past five years as a result of the enactment and implementation of the ACA. The
historical rationales in support of CON programs seem particularly anachronistic in
today’s rapidly changing healthcare landscape, and critics rightly observe that the
persistence of CON laws has the potential to slow necessary change in healthcare
delivery systems. Already, healthcare consumes approximately 17.5% of the U.S.
GDP,341 and there is almost no evidence that CON laws have slowed that rise, and
considerable evidence that CON programs may contribute to increased cost, lower
quality, and foregone opportunities for market forces to incentivize the provision of
more efficient services. Nonetheless, CON laws persist for various reasons, not
least among them the power of entrenched healthcare interests in states with CON
programs and the resulting political inertia that prevents repeal or significant
modification of the programs.

340
See, e.g., Certificate of Need Newsletter, OFF. OF HEALTH POL’Y (Ky. Cabinet for Health &
Fam. Servs., Frankfort, Ky.), Dec. 17, 2015, at 1, 4–15, chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/FA3880A8-8E434D8D-ABD3-F7EB0478B061/0/DEC2015.doc [https://perma.cc/PDS4-SYQD].
341
National Health Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TBQ-B6VD] (last
visited Nov 3, 2016).
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Kentucky was widely recognized as among the most successful states in its
implementation of ACA.342 As part of its implementation efforts, the
Commonwealth undertook a thorough review of its CON program and identified
opportunities to modify the program to create opportunities for providers who
embrace rather than resist efficient changes in care delivery systems and valuebased payment models, including use of electronic medical records, participation in
the Commonwealth’s health information exchange, attainment of objective quality
standards under federal provider rating systems such as Medicare Hospital
Compare, and participation in federally supported value-based payment programs.
While it remains to be seen how a new gubernatorial administration will
implement these reforms, and whether there will remain sufficient political will to
retain them, these reforms may offer insight to additional states as they consider
whether and how to reform their own CON programs. Indeed, rather than being a
persistent nuisance that must be tolerated and worked around because there is no
political will to change the status quo, it may be possible for a modernized CON
program to serve as an additional regulatory tool for states seeking to nudge their
healthcare providers into fuller engagement in the post-Affordable Care Act
healthcare landscape.
Table 1: Regulated CON Service by State 343
Regulated Services

Number of
States

States, Districts & Commonwealth

Acute Hospital Beds

28

AL, AK, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL,
IA, KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO,
NV, NJ, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT,
VA, WA, WV, DC

Air Ambulance

5 +DC

AL, ME, MA, MI, VT, DC

Ambulance Services,
Ground

1

AZ

(generally not counted
as a CON state)
342
See, e.g., Samantha Artiga, et al., Implementation of the ACA in Kentucky: Lessons Learned to
Date and the Potential Effects of Future Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 2016),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-implementation-of-the-aca-in-kentucky-lessons-learned-todate-and-the-potential-effects-of-future-changes [https://perma.cc/HEC6-UQJR].
343
Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/T4UX8ME3].
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Ambulatory Surgical
Centers (ASC)

27

AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IL, IA,
KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, MT,
NV, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA,
WA, WV, DC

Burn Care

11

AL, HI, ME, MD, NJ, NY, NC,
TN, VT, WA, DC

Cardiac
Catheterization

26

AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IL, IA,
KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO, NJ,
NY, NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA,
WV, DC

Computed
Tomography (CT)
Scanners

13

AK, CT, HI, ME, MI, MO, NY,
NC, RI, VT, VA, WV, DC

Gamma Knives

15

AL, AK, GA, HI, ME, MA, MI,
MS, MO, NC, RI, SC, VT, VA, DC

Home Health

18

AL, AR, GA, HI, KY, MD, MS,
MT, NJ, NY, NC, SC, TN, VT,
WA, WV, DC

Hospice

18

AL, AR, CT, FL, HI, KY, MD, MS,
NY, NC, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT,
WA, WV, DC

Intermediate Care
Facilities/Mental
Retardation
(ICF/MR)

22

AR, FL, GA, HI, IL, IA, KY, LA,
MD, MS, MO, MT, NV, NJ, NC,
OK, SC, TN, VT, VA, WV, WI

Long Term Acute
Care (LTAC)

26 +DC

AL, AK, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL,
IA, KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO,
NJ, NC, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA,
WA, WV, DC

Lithotripsy

14 +DC

AK, DE, GA, HI, ME, MA, MI,
MO, NY, NC, SC, TN, VT, VA,
DC
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Nursing Home
Beds/Long Term Care
Beds

36 +DC

AL, AK, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI,
IL, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI,
MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NJ, NY,
NC, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, VT,
VA, WA, WV, WI, DC

Medical Office
Buildings

1 +DC

VT, DC

Mobile Hi
Technology (CT /
MRI / PET, etc.)

15 +DC

AK, CT, HI, KY, ME, MI, MO,
NY, NC, RI, SC, VT, VA, WV, DC

Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI)
Scanners

18 +DC

AK, CT, HI, KY, ME, MA, MI,
MS, MO, NY, NC, RI, SC, TN,
VT, VA, WV, DC

Neo-Natal Intensive
Care

23

AL, AK, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY,
ME, MD, MA, MI, NJ, NY, NC,
RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA, WV,
DC

Obstetrics Services

15

AL, AK, CT, GA, HI, IL, ME,
MD, NY, RI, VT, VA, WA, WV,
DC

Open Heart Surgery

25

AL, AK, CT, GA, HI, IL, IA, KY,
ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, NJ, NY,
NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA,
WV, DC

Organ Transplants

21

AL, AK, CT, FL, HI, IL, IA, KY,
ME, MD, MA, MI, NJ, NY, NC,
RI, VT, VA, WA, WV, DC

Positron Emission
Tomography (PET)
Scanners

20

AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, KY, ME,
MA, MI, MS, MO, NC, RI, SC,
TN, VT, VA, WV, DC

Psychiatric Services

26

AL, AK, AR, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL,
KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, NJ,
NC, OK, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA,

2016–2017

Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era
WA, WV, DC

Radiation Therapy

23

AL, AK, CT, DE, GA, HI, IA, KY,
ME, MA, MI, MS, MO, NY, NC,
RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WV, DC

Rehabilitation

25

AL, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, ME, MD,
MA, MS, MO, MT, NE, NJ, NY,
NC, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, WA,
WV, DC

Renal Failure/Dialysis

12

AL, AK, HI, IL, ME, MS, NY, NC,
VT, WA, WV, DC

Assisted Living
& Residential Care
Facilities

5

AR, LA, MO, NC, VT

Subacute Services

13

AK, FL, HI, IL, NC, OK, RI, SC,
TN, WA, WI, VT, DC

Substance/Drug Abuse

19

AL, CT, FL, GA, HI, KY, ME,
MD, MA, MS, MT, NC, RI, SC,
TN, VT, WV, DC

Swing Beds

12

AL, HI, IL, ME, MI, MS,
MT, OR, TN, VT, WA, DC

Ultra-Sound

4

HI, ME, VT, DC
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